In treating this subject, three inquiries present themselves, viz. 1. Whether a house of commons, or popular assembly, formed a part of the Hebrew constitution? 2. If so, who composed it? 3. What were its powers?
The first of these interrogatories must be answered in the affirmative. It is an undoubted fact that there was a popular branch in the Hebrew government. This body was called by different titles--as the congregation, the congregation of Israel, all the assembly, all the children of Israel, and the whole congregation of the Lord. Moses was directed to make two silver trumpets, and the following law was enacted respecting the use of them: "And when they shall blow with them, all the assembly shall assemble themselves to thee at the door of the tabernacle of the congregation. And if they blow but with one trumpet, then the princes, which are heads of the thousands of Israel, shall gather themselves unto thee."1 Other scriptures might be cited, but this passage alone is decisive, and, indeed there is no dispute on this point among those who have written on the Hebrew institutions.
In regard to the second question, viz. as to who composed the congregation, there is less unanimity of opinion. Lowman does not doubt, from its being described in expressions so full and emphatic, as "all the congregation of Israel," "the whole congregation of Jehovah," and the like, that every free Israelite had a right to vote in this assembly. Harrington is of the same opinion. He says, "While the whole people was an army, Moses could propose to them in body, or under their staves, or standards of their camps; then he needed not, and so he used not, any representative." Both these writers think that there were different manners of holding this assembly, the people sometimes voting in mass, and sometimes by deputies. The abbe Guenee holds the like view. "The assemblies under Moses," he observes, "while the Hebrews formed one great army, very much resembled the assemblies of the people at Athens, at Lacedaemon, and at Rome; but afterwards, it would seem, they were often composed of deputies, of representatives of the people, not unlike the parliaments of England and the states of Holland." Salvador, the learned Jewish author, is of the same way of thinking. He regards it as the inalienable right of every Hebrew citizen to have session and vote in the general assembly, basing it, however, upon the false principle, borrowed from Rousseau, that the people, properly so called, have that in common with the Deity, that they cannot be rigidly represented but by themselves. Jahn also expresses the opinion that, at least upon very important occasions, as many of the common people as chose to attend, took part in the deliberations and resolves of this body.
I cannot concur in the view of these learned men. More just and scriptural appears to me the opinion of Michaelis, that the Hebrew people never voted as a pure democracy, but always, in the wilderness, as well as after their settlement in Canaan, by known and authorized representatives. His argument in support of this view seems to be conclusive, and I therefore present it in his own words: "From various passages in the Pentateuch, we find that Moses, at making known any laws, had to convene the whole congregation of Israel; and in like tanner, in the book of Joshua, we see, that when diets were held, the whole congregation were assembled. If on such occasions every individual had to give his vote, everything would certainly have been democratic in the highest degree; but it is scarcely conceivable how, without very particular regulations made for the purpose (which, however, we nowhere find), order could have been preserved in an assembly of six hundred thousand men, their votes accurately numbered, and acts of violence prevented. If, however, we consider that, while Moses is said to have spoken to the whole congregation, he could not possibly be heard by six hundred thousand people (for what human voice could be sufficiently strong to be so?), all our fears and difficulties will vanish; for this circumstance alone must convince any one, that Moses could only have addressed himself to a certain number of persons, deputed to represent the rest of the Israelites. Accordingly, in Numbers 1:16, we find mention of such persons. In contradistinction to the common Israelites, they are there denominated 'those wont to be called to the convention.' In the 16th chapter of the same book, verse 2, they are styled 'chiefs of the community, that are called to the convention.' I notice this passage particularly, because it appears from it, that two hundred and fifty persons of this description, who rose up against Moses, became to him objects of extreme terror; which they could not have been, if their voices had not been, at the same time, the voices of their families and tribes. Still more explicit, and to the point, is the passage, Deuteronomy 29:9, where Moses, in a speech to the whole people, says, 'Ye stand this day all of you before the Lord your God, your heads, your tribes (that is, chiefs of tribes), your elders, your scribes, all Israel, infants, wives, strangers that are in your camp, from the hewer of wood to the drawer of water.' Now, as Moses could not possibly speak loud enough to be heard by two millions and a half of people (for to so many did the Israelites amount, women and children included), it must be manifest, that the first-named persons represented the people, to whom they again repeated the words of Moses. Whether these representatives were on every occasion obliged to collect and declare the sense of their constituents, or whether, like the members of the English house of commons, they acted in the plenitude of their own power for the general good, without taking instructions from their constituents, I find nowhere expressly determined; but, methinks, from a perusal of the Bible, I can scarcely doubt, that the latter was the case. Who these representatives were, may, in some measure, be understood from Joshua 23:2, and 24:1. They would seem to have been of two sorts. To some, their office as judges gave a right to appear in the assembly; and these were not necessarily of the same family in which they exercised that office. Others, again, had a seat and a voice in the diet, as the heads of families."
But the particular constitution of the popular branch of the Hebrew government, as to the persons composing it, is a matter comparatively indifferent. The material part of the inquiry, which will be found eminently worthy of our attention, relates to the functions which that body exercised. These were of a grave and important kind, and such as to evince the supremacy of the popular will under this constitution. A few instances, chosen out of many, will illustrate the powers confided to this department of the government. We shall find them broad and comprehensive, extending to the election of magistrates, the management of foreign relations, the adjudication of civil and criminal causes, and the care of ecclesiastical affairs.
In the nineteenth chapter of Exodus, we have a deeply interesting account of the manner in which God was chosen king of the Hebrew people, and the laws adopted, which he proposed for their government. Moses, having received a commission to make the proposition to the nation, "came and called for the elders of the people, and laid before their princes all these words, which Jehovah commanded him. And all the people answered together, and said, All that Jehovah hath spoken we will do. And Moses returned the words of the people unto Jehovah." Here we have an account of the form in which questions were proposed and resolved in the national legislature. It is the just and philosophical remark of Lowman on this passage, that legal forms explain the true powers of any part of a constitution much better than general arguments. Let the reader observe how closely this form of voting resembles that called a ragatio among the Romans. A proposal from the senate to the people was in these words: "Is it your will, O Romans, and do you resolve it?" To which the response, if affirmative, was: "We will, and resolve it." In the above election, the elders only are mentioned by name, but it is manifest from the expression, "all the people answered and said," that it was the act of the general diet of Israel. The term "elders" was not restricted to any one class of functionaries, and it is certainly a select assembly, which, on this occasion, responded to the proposal of Moses, yet it is stated in the broadest terms, "all the people answered." The appointment of Joshua to be the successor of Moses appears, from the record of it in the twenty-seventh chapter of Numbers, to have been made, or at least confirmed, by the popular vote in the national diet. He was to be set before "all the congregation," and, when thus proposed, he appears to have been elected by their vote to the chief magistracy of Israel.
So also Saul, though designated to the regal office by the lot, was nevertheless chosen king by the great national diet--the congregation the people. Afterwards, to quiet the dissatisfaction of certain malcontents, "Samuel summoned the people by their representatives to Gilgal," says the historian, "and there they made Saul king before the Lord in Gilgal."2 When Adonihan, in anticipation of his father David's death, endeavored to seize upon the supreme authority, the latter, by a royal edict, caused Solomon to be proclaimed king. But he immediately summoned the parliament of the realm, and proposed Solomon as his successor, and the history adds, "They made Solomon, the son of David, king the second time. ... Then Solomon sat on the throne, ... and all Israel obeyed him"--evidently as being the sovereign of their own choice.3 Josephus informs us that, when Moses announced the appointment of Aaron to the priesthood by Jehovah, he took pains to impress the assembly kith a sense of his brother's great merits, whereupon, he adds, the Hebrews gave their approbation to him whom God had appointed. Jeroboam is expressly said to have been made king by the congregation of Israel.4
These instances sufficiently evince the authority of the popular voice, through its representatives, in the election of the national rulers.
The management of the foreign relations of the nation belonged, in part, to the congregation. This is evident from what occurred in the case of the Gibeonites, soon after the passage of the Jordan. Joshua, deceived by their plausible tale, made with them a treaty of peace, which was confirmed by the oath of the senate of princes. But when the imposition was discovered, the congregation was loud in its complaints, and could with difficulty be induced to give its assent to the arrangement. It seems a fair inference from this relation that a convention of peace, though made by judge and senate, still needed the ratification of the people, in their national assembly, in order to its full and binding authority.
The jurisdiction of the congregation extended also to civil causes. The question of female succession, in default of male heirs, was, by petition from the daughters of Zelophehad, laid before Moses, the priest, the princes, and all the congregation. Their father, they alleged, had died without sons, and their request was that they might be constituted his heirs. The question, being a novel one, was referred, by the other departments of the government, to the oracle. The response was that the demand of the young women was reasonable and ought to be granted. Thereupon a decree was passed to that effect, and a law was enacted to settle the matter of female succession for all after ages. Here is the oracle of Jehovah. Here is the senate of princes. And here, finally, is the congregation of all Israel.5 The body before which this question is brought, was an assembly of the states-general of Israel, composed judge, senate, and commons; and the history of the affair shows plainly that questions of this nature were properly, according to the Hebrew constitution, brought before them.
To the congregation belonged likewise the right of taking cognizance of criminal matters. It was expressly charged with judging between the slayer and the avenger of blood: "Then the congregation shall judge between the slayer and the revenger of blood according to these judgments. And the congregation shall deliver the slayer out of the hand of revenger of blood, and the congregation shall restore him to the city of his refuge, whither he was fled: and he shall abide in it unto the death of the high priest, which was anointed with the holy oil."6 It matters not whether the congregation here spoken of was provincial or national, for, whatever rights were vested in the lower assembly would undoubtedly inhere in the higher.
An instance of the power of the Hebrew commons in criminal questions occurs in the history of Saul, and is too interesting to be passed silence.7 Upon a certain occasion, Saul had given an order, forbidding his army to taste food, during a day's encounter with the Philistines. Whoever violated the prohibition was devoted to certain death by the oath of the king. Jonathan, to whose prudence and valor, under God, the victory was entirely owing, ignorant both of the order and the anathema, and worn down with the fatigues of battle, had eaten a little wild honey. Upon his confession of the fault, Saul fiercely exclaims, "God do so to me, and more also; for thou shalt surely die, Jonathan." This is very positive, and seems irreversible. Yet the people step in, and say, "Shall Jonathan die, who hath wrought this great salvation for Israel? God forbid! As Jehovah liveth, there shall not an hair his head fall to the ground. So the people rescued [literally, redeemed] Jonathan." Bishop Patrick truly observes on this place that the people did not rescue Jonathan by violence or force. Yet his further opinion, and that of the learned Grotius, that the rescue was effected by petition, seems not at all consistent with the expressions employed. "As Jehovah liveth, there shall not an hair of his head fall to the ground," has very little the sound of a humble request to a master. It is more like the voice of conscious authority, clear and strong in the expression of an undoubted right. Neither is the expression "redeemed Jonathan," properly descriptive of an act of mutiny or rebellion. There remains, then, but the conclusion that it was an exercise of rightful authority, whereby the unconscious offender was pardoned, and the sentence of death reversed, in the general court of Israel. It is thus that Lowman interprets the procedure.
Ecclesiastical affairs were also, to some extent at least, subject to the jurisdiction and control of the Hebrew commons. When David wished to remove the ark to Jerusalem, he would nod do so without a formal vote of the congregation to that effect.8 On the accession of Solomon to the throne, when Abiathar was deposed from the office of high priest, and Zadok elevated to that dignity, it was "all the congregation," the great assembly of the people, that established the latter in the high-priesthood, and caused him to receive the sacerdotal unction, which constituted a chief part of the inaugural ceremony.9
In the brief digest of the English constitution, which Montesquieu has given in the sixth chapter of the eleventh book of his Spirit of Laws, he makes the following remark: "Whoever shall read the admirable treatise of Tacitus on the manners of the Germans, will find that it is from them the English have borrowed the idea of their political government. This beautiful system was invented first in the woods." On referring to the passage in Tacitus, cite by the learned jurist, it will be found that the historian says, "Ordinary affairs were treated in the council of chiefs; great affairs, in the assembly of the people; yet so that those matters, on which it belonged to the people to decide, were debated by the chiefs." On this Salvador has well observed that Montesquieu might have traced the idea of the English constitution to a higher source, and made it rest upon bases more sacred in the eyes of modern nations. This beautiful system of government invented in the woods indeed! Its true source is the inspired legislation of Moses. Besides their military chiefs (the council to which Tacitus referred), the Hebrews had a senate of civilians, as well as a house of commons. They recognized three distinct crowns--the crown of the priests, the crown of the law, and the crown of the king; in other words, the sacerdotal or conservative power, the legislative power, and the executive power. Besides, how many of the English have ever read Tacitus? Whereas the Bible, found in every house, has exercised the greatest influence over their manners and institutions, and has produced more than one point of resemblance between the ancient people of Israel and the first nation of modern times, which has comprehended the whole power of law, and has founded its polity on the principle that laws ought to govern, rather than the will and pleasure of the prince.
